Voice: Voting and Political Expression in the Gulf by unknown
  
The State of Opportunity  
One Year After Hurricane Katrina 
 
Voice: Voting and Political Expression in the Gulf 
Democracy depends on the ability of all people to participate in the public dialogue. Without the ability to express 
viewpoints and have them represented in government, individuals cannot exercise political power to help shape 
their community and country.  
 
Many displaced residents of the Gulf Coast region are finding it difficult in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita to express their viewpoints and participate in the political process. Early evidence finds that many groups—
including racial and ethnic minorities and low-income families—have struggled to vote in post-hurricane elec-
tions and to have a say in the region’s reconstruction plans. These problems mirror national trends, but also sug-
gest that another unfortunate legacy of the hurricanes of 2005 could be an erosion of voice among those commu-
nities whose political expression was most endangered prior to the storms. Without their diverse viewpoints, the 
region’s reconstruction risks suffering from insularity and a failure to reap the benefits of pluralism. Voice is 
therefore an important element of opportunity for those most victimized by Katrina. 
 
This fact sheet summarizes research on the political participation of vulnerable Gulf Coast communities after Ka-
trina, as well as national trends in electoral participation. It draws on this research to identify obstacles to political 
participation, and offers recommendations for means to expand voice for all. 
 
Political Participation in New Orleans After 
Katrina 
Municipal elections in damaged Gulf Coast cit-
ies have key implications for voice and political 
power in the rebuilding process. In New Or-
leans, municipal elections were conducted under 
the extraordinary circumstances of mass voter 
displacement. Voting data from the April 2006 
primary and the subsequent mayoral race reveal 
the following: 
• As many predicted, voter turnout was low, 
and turnout in the mayoral runoff election 
was 40% lower than the potential voter 
turnout, as exemplified by the voter turnout 
witnessed in November 2004 national elec-
tion.1 
• The numbers of absentee votes (almost 
25,000 votes in the runoff) represented less 
than one-fifth of the estimated 200,000 reg-
istered voters living outside New Orleans 
due to the mass displacement.2 
• Because African American residents repre-
sented a disproportionately high number of 
the displaced population, their share of the 
electorate declined from 63% in 2004 to 
57% in 2006.3 
• In comparison to the most recent pre-
Katrina mayoral election in 2002, voter 
turnout by neighborhood also showed a de-
cline. In the New Orleans East neighbor-
hood, which is predominantly black and 
middle class, turnout for the May elections 
  
fell by 23%. And in the predominantly low-
income African American Lower Ninth 
Ward, turnout fell by nearly 40%.4 
• The municipal elections reflected a shift 
toward a more affluent, white, and home-
owning population in the New Orleans 
constituency. The results also reflected how 
the limited opportunity to return minimized 
the political voice of those that were hard-
est hit by the hurricane.5 
 
The 2006 New Orleans municipal elections were 
especially important for New Orleans residents, 
as the officials elected in those races will play a 
key role in the city’s rebuilding efforts. A vari-
ety of avoidable problems plagued the 2006 
New Orleans elections: 
• The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) released evacuee informa-
tion only to the Louisiana Secretary of 
State, but not to candidates or the public, 
thereby limiting displaced voters’ access to 
comprehensive election information.6 
• Among problems that were documented by 
polling monitors in predominantly African 
American Orleans Parish were voters hav-
ing been incorrectly purged from the state’s 
registration rolls, unwarranted police pres-
ence at various polling stations, poorly 
marked polling sites, and early closure of 
polling locations.7 
• Although thousands of voters were residing 
outside Louisiana at the time of the elec-
tions, satellite polling stations were con-
fined to the state. Importantly, three-
quarters of African American evacuees 
who were not able to return to their homes 
were out of state, compared to the two-
thirds of whites who were able to return to 
Louisiana, if not New Orleans.8 
 
Other Indicators of Voice in the Gulf Coast 
Region 
In addition to voting problems, displaced and 
historically marginalized communities also ex-
perienced barriers to expressing their concerns 
and suggestions for the reconstruction process. 
Their political expression was weakened by dis-
persion and a history of political marginaliza-
tion. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina the 
hardest hit communities saw their voices stifled 
in the media through skewed representation. 
Among the documented reports of biased cover-
age of Katrina evacuees in the mainstream me-
dia are these examples: 
• A number of news outlets focused on and 
disseminated unconfirmed reports of loot-
ing and violence among Hurricane Katrina 
survivors. Subsequent investigations 
proved many of the reported crimes and 
stories to be false.9 
• Mainstream media reports of New Orleans 
evacuees often invoked negative and highly 
damaging racial stereotypes of African 
Americans. A particularly notable example 
was that of two photographs taken and cap-
tioned by the Associated Press. The actions 
of the African American survivors were 
identified as “looting,” while the white sur-
vivors were “finding.”10 Although all par-
ties were photographed doing the same 
thing, the African American survivors were 
blatantly criminalized by biased reporting. 
• FEMA initially denied the press access to 
evacuees living in FEMA trailers, thereby 
restricting the voice of evacuees in the me-
dia. Only after pressure from reporters and 
public scrutiny did FEMA reverse its pol-
icy on entry to trailer parks.11 
 
National Trends in Political Participation and 
Voice  
The barriers to voice observed in New Orleans 
are glaring in part because of the extreme cir-
cumstances of the Katrina tragedy and its after-
math. But they reflect barriers to voice for many 
across the nation. To be sure, the nation has 
made progress in expanding voice over the last 
four decades, through such measures as passage 
of the 1965 Voting Rights Act and enactment of 
many of the 1968 Kerner Commission’s recom-
mendations about the importance of protecting 
minority voices in the media. However, signifi-
cant obstacles to full democratic participation 
and expression remain for many:  
• A trend in state legislatures—most recently 
  
Missouri’s—to require photo identification 
to vote threatens the right to vote for many 
across the country.12 Requiring eligible vot-
ers to acquire documents at their own ex-
pense presents the potential for disenfran-
chisement of vulnerable communities, like 
the elderly, the poor, and African Ameri-
cans. 
• After the 2000 presidential election, the 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights identified 
barriers to electoral participation that dis-
proportionately affect communities of color 
and other marginalized groups. Those bar-
riers include state and local variations in 
the quality of voting equipment, voter iden-
tity verification standards, sample ballots, 
use of absentee ballots, lax or nonexistent 
enforcement of federal voting rights laws, 
and inaccessible and/or overburdened poll-
ing stations.13 
• Women and minorities continue to be 
grossly underrepresented as sources in 
news reporting.14  
• Communities of color are rarely the subject 
of news stories; when they are the focus of 
reporting, the content of these stories re-
mains largely negative.15 
• The racial and ethnic diversity of radio 
news organizations declined by almost half 
between 1995 and 2005.16 
• Minority and local ownership of radio, 
television, and print media has declined in 
the face of greater corporate consolidation 
of media and communications outlets.17
 
 
Recommendations 
New Orleans and the Gulf Coast region have an important chance to rebuild just communities that allow 
all residents to have a stake and a say in decisions that affect them. Government must protect and uplift 
voices in all communities, including those of evacuees who are now contributing to new neighborhoods. 
We recommend several measures.  
• Permit hurricane evacuees to present alternative forms of identification to register and vote, such 
as FEMA relief applications, Red Cross documents, and other documents that indicate permanent 
or former address.18 
• In the event of an emergency, FEMA should make available the names and contact information of 
displaced adult residents to candidates and organizations that would normally have access to 
voter-registration records.19 
• Full and equal access to polling places is critical and should be afforded to all voters. 
• Train poll workers, and recruit multilingual poll workers, to improve local jurisdictions’ compli-
ance with federal and state voting rights laws, particularly language assistance provisions.20 
• Because the displacement of Gulf Coast residents was not indiscriminate in terms of race and in-
come levels, government should pay special attention to the makeup of the displaced voting 
population to ensure that future elections do not prevent any racial or ethnic group from exercis-
ing its right to vote.21 
• Establish minimum federal standards for voting procedures and equipment that include easier 
voter-registration requirements, federal guidelines for verifying voter identity, and uniform na-
tionwide voting hours. 
• All levels of government should vigorously enforce the Voting Rights Act in the Gulf Coast, as 
well as in communities of the displaced, and ensure full implementation of the Help America 
Vote Act. 
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